Evaluación del tamaño adecuado del alivio en la reestructuración de la deuda soberana

  • Martín Guzmán Columbia University Business School, Division of Economics; Universidad de Buenos Aires, Departamento de Economía; and Centre for International Governance Innovation
  • Domenico Lombardi Oxford Institute for Economic Policy. Centre for International Governance Innovation’s Global Economy Program
Palabras clave: Deuda soberana, Sostenibilidad, Reestructuración

Resumen

Este trabajo presenta un enfoque basado en principios para computar la quita de deuda apropriada en procesos de reestructuración de deuda soberana. Se muestra cómo calcular el monto de reducción de deuda que restaura la condición de sosteniblidad con alta probabilidad bajo la premisa de satisfacer un conjunto de restricciones impuestas por los principios que se siguen en el proceso de reestructuración. El tamaño de la quita se considera apropiado si conduce a la existencia de trayectorias de superávits fiscales primarios como ratio del PIB que son puntos fijos económica y políticamente factibles, y que satisfacen la restricción intertemporal de prespuesto del gobierno en un porcentaje “alto” de los posibles estados de la naturaleza. La factibilidad económica se define a partir de restricciones económicas, y la factibilidad política se define en función de las restricciones que imponen los principios de la reestructuración. También se muestra que desde 1970 los procesos de reestructuración soberana han sido seguidos poco tiempo después por una nueva reestructuración o default en un porcentaje alto de casos, lo que sugiere que el alivio de deuda se ha dado en la forma de “demasiado poco”.

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Publicado
2022-11-25
Cómo citar
Guzmán, M., & Lombardi, D. (2022). Evaluación del tamaño adecuado del alivio en la reestructuración de la deuda soberana. Documentos De Trabajo Del Instituto Interdisciplinario De Economía Política, (26), 1-37. Recuperado a partir de https://ojs.econ.uba.ar/index.php/DT-IIEP/article/view/2437