Modelos económicos, realismo y similaridad
Resumen
En el presente artículo se argumenta que las diferencias entre los modelos económicos son básicamente diferencias en la parte seleccionada del mundo real que estos modelos tratan de explicar. Por lo tanto, su rango de aplicabilidad a un sistema objetivo resulta ser importante para su selección para propósitos particulares. A este respecto, se proporciona un enfoque basado en la similaridad de los modelos con un sistema objetivo y con los propósitos de los modeladores. También se argumenta que los modelos varían en valores de similaridad. Estos valores ayudarán a los agentes a seleccionar el modelo que mejor se adapte a la función de examinar algún fenómeno de interés.
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